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CONDOMINIUMS AND ZONING
As an initial step in planning the development of a condominium,
the sponsor must insure that the project will meet with local zoning
board approval. While few state condominium statutes or local zoning
ordinances specifically provide for such zoning,' this is not to say
that condominiums are exempt from compliance with local zoning
regulations. Furthermore, the sponsor must consider the possible ap-
plication of local multiple dwelling laws, as well as ascertain whether
there are private covenants running with the land which restrict its use
as proposed.
The immediate problem in determining how zoning regulations
apply to condominiums is the determination of what is to be the critical
entity for zoning purposes. It can be argued that, since individual con-
dominium units are owned in fee simple, each unit is the entity and is
to be classified as a single-family residence. On the other hand, it might
be said that the entire development is the critical entity and is to be
classified as a multiple dwelling. Few zoning ordinances provide guid-
ance on this issue, and the solution is often found in the physical design
of the overall project. Under such an approach - the "look alike rule"
- if the condominium looks like a high-rise apartment, and rental
apartment houses are in compliance with zoning ordinances, the con-
dominium should not be treated any differently under existing zoning
laws. Likewise, condominiums which visibly resemble existing garden
apartments should be given similar treatment. In both cases, the entire
building rather than each unit should be considered the critical entity.
However, where a condominium is to be composed of townhouses or
detached units arranged in clusters, and there is no "look alike" per-
mitted in the area, the project may be thwarted by zoning laws requir-
ing compliance with minimum lot size, setback and yard size require-
ments applicable to conventional single-family residences.
Another problem of entity categorization may result from classi-
fication of condominiums as multiple dwellings calling for compliance
with local multiple dwelling codes. Such codes might require, for
example, a resident housekeeper, peepholes in doors, fAre escapes and
bright lighting.2 One writer has argued that such codes should not be
1 For an analysis of each state condominium act and related statutes as to the
application of local zoning and subdivision controls to condominiums see 4A R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 633.32 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
2 See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 37, 51-a, 53. 83 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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applied to lateral condominiums which more closely resemble private,
single-family homes than rental apartments. 3
The majority of condominium statutes which do mention the ap-
plication of local zoning ordinances follow the look alike rule.4 Some
condominium statutes mandate this nondiscriminatory interpretation
of zoning ordinances.5 Other statutes require that the look alike prin-
ciple be applied "unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed" in the
ordinance.6 It would thus appear that in these states discriminatory
treatment of condominiums by local zoning officials is not absolutely
prohibited. However, the validity of zoning ordinances which discrimi-
nate against or in favor of condominiums can be attacked on the
ground that local governments should only regulate the use of property,
not its ownership.7 Of the condominium statutes which address zoning
matters but do not follow the look alike rule, one simply provides that
property on which a condominium is established is not relieved from
compliance with local ordinances;8 others authorize local zoning au-
thorities to adopt supplemental rules and regulations to implement the
condominium statute.9
3 Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners
Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1131 (1969). Professor Schreiber doubts, however,
that local authorities, who are mostly concerned with protection of the rental occupant,
will insist on enforcing multiple dwelling codes against privately owned condominium
units. Id.
4 A look alike provision is contained in the condominium statutes of the following
jurisdictions: Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Jersey, Texas and Washington.
5 ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.440 (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.21 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 21, § 11-120 (1974); N.J. REv. STAT. § 46: 8B-29 (Supp. 1973); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. I301a, § 23 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. tit. 55, ch. 4.2, § 55-79.43 (Supp. 1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.32.110 (Supp. 1973). Typical of the look alike statutes is the
Florida statute, which provides:
All laws, ordinances and regulations concerning buildings or zoning shall be con-
strued and applied with reference to the nature and use of such property with-
out regard to the form of ownership. No law, ordinance or regulation shall
establish any requirement concerning the use or location, placement or construc-
tion of buildings or other improvements which are, or may thereafter be
subjected to the condominium form of ownership, unless such requirement shall
be equally applicable to all buildings and improvements of the same kind not
then or thereafter to be subjected to the condominium form of ownership.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.21 (Supp. 1973).
6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 55-1524 (1969); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 896.17 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 117.110 (1973). The Idaho statute, for
example, provides:
Unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed in local zoning ordinances, such
ordinances shall be construed to treat like structures, lots, or parcels in like
manner regardless of whether the ownership thereof is divided by sale of con-
dominiums created in a project pursuant to this act, rather than by the lease or
other disposition of such structures, lots or parcels ....
IDAHO CODE § 55-1524 (1969).
7 See text accompanying notes 11-17 infra.
8 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50(29) (Supp. 1973).
9 D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-928 (1966); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.910 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47A-27 (1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2721 (Supp. 1973).
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While the look alike rule does not resolve every possible zoning
problem for the condominium sponsor, it is, at least, fair in that it
recognizes that the proper object of zoning is to regulate the use of
property rather than its ownership. 10 The appeal of the look alike rule
is easy to appreciate where an existing apartment building is to be
converted to a condominium. The use of the property and the appear-
ance of the building before and after the conversion are the same. Only
the form of ownership has changed, and clearly, the regulation of
ownership by local zoning authorities would be an unconstitutional
exercise of local police power. Such regulation would bear no rational
relation to the health, safety, welfare or morals of the community."'
Though little case law appears in the area, New Jersey courts have
twice had occasion, in a condominium context, to rule on the authority
of local governments to restrict land ownership. However, in neither
Professor Rohan argues that since these statutes authorize only the adoption of
regulations which would serve to implement the condominium program, zoning ordi-
nances passed pursuant to such statutes cannot discriminate against the condominium
form of property ownership. 4A POWELL 633.32, at 900.14. It should be added that
neither can zoning ordinances passed pursuant to such statutes discriminate in favor of
condominium ownership, since zoning authorities can only regulate the use of property
and not its ownership. See text accompanying notes 11-17 infra.
10See, e.g., Feinberg v. Southland Corp., 268 Md. 141, -, 301 A.2d 6, 11-12 (1973)
("As we have observed in prior decisions, zoning ordinances are 'concerned with the use
of property and not with the ownership thereof nor with the purposes of the owners or
occupants .... '); Jeffery v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 232 A.2d 497, 499 n.2
(Conn. Sup. Ct. 1967) ("Of course zoning is concerned with the use, rather than the owner-
ship, of property."); State ex rel. Parker v. Konopka, 119 Ohio App. 513, -, 200 N.E.2d
695, 696 (1963) ("Zoning ordinances or regulations have reference to land use rather than
to the persons who own the land."); Dukes v. Shell Oil Co., 40 Del. Ch. 174, -, 177 A.2d
785, 792 (Ct. Ch. New Castle 1962) ("[Z]oning laws are not designed to restrict land owner-
ship, but only land use.").
11 In a much criticized case, Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d
439 (1950), the California Supreme Court upheld a local zoning ordinance which, in
effect, restricted the ownership of property. The particular ordinance in question pro-
hibited the reduction of land ownership into lots of less than 5000 square feet; it also
required a minimum of 800 square feet per dwelling unit. The plaintiff, who had been
renting nine bungalows on his property, divided the property into nine lots, each having
one bungalow and an area of 925 square feet, and sold eight of the lots to various parties.
Threatened with prosecution, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that enforcement of the ordinance would be beyond the legitimate scope of the
local police power and would violate his constitutional rights. The court upheld the
ordinance as a valid exercise of local police power for the prevention of "overcrowding"
and "slum conditions," which would allegedly result from a lack of uniform control and
repair. Id. at -, 222 P.2d at 442-43.
The Clemons decision has been criticized for not having squarely faced the fact that
the ordinance in question restricted land ownership. See 4A POWELL 633.32, at 899 n.9;
64 HARV. L. REv. 326, 327 (1950). In addition, one commentator has noted that the pos-
sible deterioration which concerned the Clemons court would not be likely to occur in a
condominium, which features unified management and maintenance. Welfeld, The Con-
dominium and Median-Income Housing, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 457, 468 (1963).
A similar ordinance was later struck down by a lower California court when no such
justification could be found. See Morris v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 2d 856, 254
P.2d 935 (1953).
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case were constitutional issues discussed. In Bridge Park Co. v. Borough
of Highland Park,12 the plaintiff made plans to convert a garden apart-
ment complex to a condominium. Town officials informed him that
this action would be contrary to local zoning ordinances in that a
"garden apartment" complex, based on its definition in the ordinances,
must remain under single ownership. After being denied declaratory
and injunctive relief, the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court re-
versed, holding that under the state zoning enabling statute the town
had authority to regulate only the use of property and not its owner-
ship.13 The court read the term "use" in the statute as meaning "phys-
ical use" and concluded that "[a] building is not 'used' as a condo-
minium for purposes of zoning."' 14 In Maplewood Village Tenants Asso-
ciation v. Maplewood Village,15 the court, citing Bridge Park and the
look alike rule contained in the New Jersey condominium statute, held
that the conversion of an apartment house to a condominium did not
require the approval of local zoning authorities because, "[i]t is use
rather than form of ownership that is the proper concern and focus of
zoning and planning regulation."'16 Though the cases did not reach the
underlying constitutional issues, the conclusions of the courts in both
cases are logically compelling.
Besides resorting to court remedies when local zoning authorities
disapprove of the condominium form of ownership, the sponsor may be
able to avoid expensive litigation by obtaining administrative relief
such as a variance.' 7 In some jurisdictions, however, the seeking of
administrative relief from the requirements of local zoning ordinances
12 113 N.J. Super. 219, 273 A.2d 397 (App. Div. 1971).
13 Id. at -, 273 A.2d at 398.
14 Id. at -, 273 A.2d at 399.
15 116 N.J. Super. 372, 282 A.2d 428 (Ch. Div. 1971).
16Id. at -, 282 A.2d at 431. For similar statements see the cases cited in note 10
supra.
17 A successful attempt to obtain a variance by a real estate investor interested in
converting an existing rental project to a condominium is described in 4A POWE.L
$ 633.32, at 900.25 & n.104. A local ordinance required that land under multiple dwellings
in a particular zone remain under single ownership. The investor made the required
showing of hardship and presented the following argument for a variance, as outlined by
Professor Rohan:
It was argued that a conversion to condominium status would not violate the
basic purpose of the zoning ordinance. It is true that each purchaser would own
his unit individually and become a co-owner of the land under the building.
However, under the New York Real Property Law § 339(i) partition of the land
owned by a condominium is prohibited. Therefore the land and building would
remain in its present condition as long as a condominium existed. Accordingly,
condominium ownership could not have been the type of situation the ordinance
was intended to prevent. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the con-
dominium statute was enacted several years after the ordinance in question. Nor




may constitute an admission of their validity.'8 Whether the problem
is discriminatory treatment or the absence of a look alike structure in
the area, possible solutions, besides a request for a variance, include
requests for a special permit or an amendment to the zoning ordi-
nance. 19 However, all involve uncertainty, time consumption and ex-
pense. Much of this would be alleviated if local zoning ordinances were
revised to provide expressly for condominiums in a nondiscriminatory
manner.
It should be noted that the condominium sponsor, in striving to
obtain zoning board sanction, must not ignore the possibility that there
are restrictive covenants running with the property which prohibit the
construction of a condominium. The validity and enforceability of
restrictive covenants are not affected by local zoning ordinances or local
zoning board action.20 If the property is so burdened, the look alike
approach can be employed to the condominium sponsor's detriment,
as was demonstrated in the recent case of Callahan v. Weiland.21 In
18 See Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal. 119, 104 P.2d 1041 (1940); Piccolo v. Town
of West Haven, 120 Conn. 449, 181 A. 615 (1935); Drabble v. Zoning Bd., 52 R.I. 228,
159 A. 828 (1932).
19 Obtaining an informal opinion letter from the zoning board, and application for
a building permit have also been suggested as possible approaches. See 1 THE CON-
DOMINim REP., Dec., 1973, at 8. In one noted work the authors explain that in some
situations
[tihe locality may issue permits and withhold injunctive action in order to
build a precedent by administrative action or inaction, rather than raise a hail-
storm by ruling on the need for new ordinances or variances that require public
hearings for what will not produce look-alike housing.
D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVEs 29-30 (1970).
A good illustration of how the look alike rule may be applied by zoning authorities in
considering a request for approval of a condominium project is found in the case of
Wentworth Hotel, Inc. v. Town of New Castle, 287 A.2d 615 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1972). There
the plaintiff owned a resort hotel on 50 acres and operated it as a nonconforming use in
an area zoned partially for one single-family house per acre and partially for one two-
family residence per 10,000 square feet. After a fire had destroyed one wing of the hotel,
the plaintiff planned to construct a condominium complex, which would consist of a 104
unit structure to replace the razed wing and an additional 176 units on ground previously
vacant. The local zoning board granted the plaintiff's request for a variance as to the
structure to replace the hotel wing, but denied its application as to the rest of the units.
On appeal, the plaintiff insisted that it was not requesting a use for apartments but a resi-
dential use not known at the time the ordinance was enacted and, therefore, not covered
by it. The court upheld the partial granting of the variance as to the 104 unit structure
on the ground that the construction of such structure would not substantially enlarge
the use of the land. Id. at 618. However, the court also upheld the denial of the plaintiff's
request as to the remaining units. Id. at 619. Finding that the use of the land as proposed
by the plaintiff would result in more of a population concentration than would the uses
permitted by the ordinances, the court was of the opinion that "[a]lthough the ownership
may be different, condominium dwellings of the type contemplated are not unlike apart-
ment dwellings so far as the actual use of the land is concerned." Id. at 618.
20Whiting v. Seavey, 159 Me. 61, 188 A.2d 276 (1963); Murphey v. Gray, 84 Ariz. 299,
327 P.2d 751 (1958); Strauss v. Ginzberg, 217 Minn. 57, 15 N.V.2d 130 (1944).
21279 So. 2d 451 (Ala. 1973).
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Callahan, the use of the property in issue was subject to a restrictive
covenant which provided that
no building, except a single dwelling house ... shall be erected or
maintained on said property.., it being intended hereby to pro-
hibit . ..on said premises any ...apartment house, double or
duplex house .... 22
The granting of an injunction against the construction of a 10-story
condominium was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. The owner
of the property argued that the restriction against apartment houses
should not be deemed to apply to condominiums since condominiums
were unknown in the state at the time the restrictions were written. He
also contended that a condominium is but a single residence. The court
determined that the intent of the covenant was to prevent an over-
density of population and that the construction of any multi-unit
dwelling, whether called an apartment or a condominium, would be
contrary to this intent.23 The court held that "a condominium is within
the scope and meaning of the word 'apartment house' as it appears in
the restrictive provision .... -24 It has been noted in one topical report
that, although the Callahan decision is sound on the facts presented,
it is less clear whether other commonly used covenants would prohibit
the erection of a condominium. 25 The report suggests that a covenant
simply restricting the property to "one-family homes" should not bar
townhouse condominiums.2 6 However, a court might well decide that
the construction of attached condominium units would greatly increase
population density in violation of the intent of a covenant entered into
by the owners of detached single-family homes.
Reliance upon the look alike rule does not fulfill the need for zoning
ordinances which specifically allow for various types of condominium
developments. It is true that where a proposed condominium clearly
resembles an approved existing structure, use of the rule should pro-
duce an equitable result.2 7 However, the look alike rule is often of little
22 Id. at 453.
23 Id. at 457.
24 Id.
25 1 THE CONDOMINIUM REP., Dec., 1973, at 8.
26 Id.
27 For example, a high-rise condominium should be treated, for zoning purposes, the
same as a high-rise apartment building. Unfortunately, under some local community
planning programs, apartment buildings are often placed in less desirable locations, some-
times at the edge of a ghetto area in order to serve as a buffer. See D. CLURMAN & E.
HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 30 (1970).
The argument might be made that high-rise condominiums should be given more
favorable treatment than the apartment buildings they resemble on the ground that they
are less detrimental to community stability. In other words, it might be said that con-
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value when applied to lateral condominiums, especially those of the
open-space cluster type. Very often there are no similar developments
with which they may be compared. To require that condominiums
comply with zoning regulations applicable to conventional single-
family homes is very often unrealistic. Blanket classification of all
condominiums as multiple dwellings is also inappropriate.
To encourage increasingly popular cluster developments, flexible
zoning provisions should be adopted by local zoning boards. These
provisions would focus on the overall use of property rather than on
the characteristics of individual dwelling units. Density and bulk con-
trols would concentrate less on minimum frontage, lot sizes and yard
sizes, and more on maximum number of families per acre and maxi-
mum percentage of the total lot that can be occupied. Height controls
would, likewise, allow for some flexibility. The consequent availability
of large open expanses for recreational, aesthetic and environmental
purposes affords broad creative potential. Rentals, as well as condo-
miniums, would, of course, be permitted as long as the applicable
criteria were met.
In revising local ordinances to facilitate condominium development,
zoning authorities should survey the monotonous landscape which has
resulted from inflexible zoning ordinances designed to preserve the
character, beauty and homogeneity of neighborhoods. They may realize
that stimulation of condominium development could provide the more
varied residential patterns which many neighborhoods sorely need.2
Joseph M. Mattingly
dominium residents, having an investment in the property, are probably less transient
than apartment dwellers, and are more likely to take good care of the property and to
become active in community affairs. While this argument may have logical appeal, it alone
would not justify zoning discrimination favoring condominiums since property use rather
than ownership is the proper object of zoning controls. See text accompanying notes 11-17
supra.
28 See D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMsINIUMS AND COOPERATIVEs 30-31 (1970).
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